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INTRODUCTION

In the four decades following the end of World War II, the
East-West political divide played a central role in the functioning of the United Nations (hereinafter U.N.). The world balance
of power during this period, reflected in the structure of the Security Council's (hereinafter Council) permanent membership,
often frustrated the Council's ability to act quickly and effectively to deal with perceived threats to the peace. With either
side able to veto the use of armed force, it was only in unique
situations such as the U.N. action in Korea that the Council
was able to function as originally envisaged. 1 However, events
in recent years have transformed the global political arena
quickly and drastically. The collapse of the 'iron curtain' and
the movement of Russia and other former Soviet Republics towards democracy has led to tangible reductions in nuclear and
conventional weapons and a marked decline in East-West tension. The stage has been set for the emergence of a new world
order, one in which there will likely be a greater role to be
played by supranational institutions, particularly the U.N. The
Secretary-General of the U.N. acknowledged this development
in his report, An Agenda for Peace, addressing the changing
1 The Council was able to authorize a U.N. force to act in Korea due to the
absence of the Soviet delegate at that meeting. The Soviet delegate was protesting
the representation of China in the U.N. by the Nationalist Chiang Kai-Shek. If the
Soviet delegate had been present at that meeting, he would have certainly used his
veto power to block the resolution. See LELAND M. GOODRICH, KOREA: A STUDY OF
U.S. POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS
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context of international relations and the need for the U.N. to
play a greater role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts
2
and the preservation of peace.
One of the main beneficiaries of these developments has
been the Council, which emerged from under the shadow of the
permanent stalemate in existence since its creation. No longer
paralyzed by superpower vetoes, the Council has displayed an
unprecedented activism in the past five years, 3 including a key
role in the Gulf War. Some analysts portray this activism as
proof of the emergence of a new world order in which our international institutions will function quickly and effectively.
Others claim that no new world order has yet emerged to replace that of the Cold War. According to this line of reasoning,
the Council was established based on the premise of a SovietWestern bipolar model of world order, with the resultant balance of power between the Soviet bloc states and the Western
states~and their allies.4 No other checks were provided for at
that time because no need was seen. Following the demise of
the bipolar model, no political equilibrium has emerged to replace these lost checks and balances. It has been suggested by
many that such checks will be necessary to prevent infringements on state sovereignty and to balance an unleashed Council determined to take advantage of its new found power
in traditional or other ways. 5 Iraq took this view with
2 BouTmos BouTRos-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 7-8 (1992).

See e.g. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/3063 (1992) (economic and diplomatic sanctions on Libya); S.C. Res. 678,
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2963 (1990) (authorizing the use of force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait); S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/3106 (1992) (authorizing peacekeeping
for humanitarian purposes in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
4 Edward McWhinney, The InternationalCourt as Emerging Constitutional
Court and the Coordinate UN Institutions (Especiallythe Security Council):Implications of the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, 30 CAN. Y.B. Irr'L L. 261 (1992).
S The Council issued the following statement at the summit meeting of Jan.
31, 1992:
The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself
ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a
whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest
priority to the solution of these matters.
U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3046, 143 (1992).
3
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regard to the Council's resolutions during and after the Gulf
War.

6

In light of these concerns the International Court of Justice
(hereinafter the Court) has become the focus of much attention.
As the principal judicial organ of the U.N.,7 it has been championed as a possible check on unbridled Council power, the missing link in order to restore some kind of balance to the U.N.
system. There is some uncertainty with regard to the legal basis for this suggestion. The question of whether the Court has
the competence to review the legality of a Council decision has
been considered. It was generally accepted for years by many
experts that Council resolutions could not in fact be reviewed by
the Court." However, recently it appears there has been a shift
in popular opinion, largely based on the Provisional Measures
decision in Lockerbie,9 towards a view that the Court may indeed possess a power of judicial review.
Before beginning an analysis of possible Court power in
this area, it is necessary to clarify the sense in which the term
'judicial review' is being used. In the U.K., this term connotes
an accepted power of the High Court to supervise the activities
of government bodies on the basis of principles of public law.10
The power to review decisions is not with reference to a written
constitution, but rather dependent on the decision being 'irrational' or 'unreasonable.' The question of how 'unreasonable' a
decision or rule must be before it is liable to be quashed was
dealt with in the 1948 King's Bench decision, Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation." Lord
6 See Geoffrey Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World
Court, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1993).
7 U.N. CHARTER art. 92. By virtue of Article 92, "[t]he International Court of
Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." Id.
8 See e.g. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 74 (1985). Some authors today still reject the idea of the Court attempting
to fill any gap in law-making power within the U.N. system by acting as a sort of
constitutional check against the newly unleashed power of the Council. See McWhinney, supra note 4, at 262.
9 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K; Libya v. U.S.),
1992 I.C.J. 3, 114 (Apr. 14) [hereinafter known as Lockerbie].
10 For further discussion of judicial review in the U.K., see PETER CANE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (1986).
11 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., 1 K.B. 223
(1948).
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Greene MR stated that if an authority's decision was "so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it,
then the courts can interfere."12
There is no suggestion that the concept of judicial review at
the international level has the U.K. connotation of reasonableness. Rather, it is generally accepted to reflect a power akin to
the U.S. Supreme Court's ability to determine the constitutionality of a rule or decision and strike it down if determined to be
unconstitutional. In Marbury v. Madison,13 an early 19th century U.S. Supreme Court case, the Supreme Court, while upholding the legality of a disputed act of a political branch of
government, gave itself the ultimate power to determine
whether the political branch has acted constitutionally in any
particular instance. The U.S. Supreme Court let President Jefferson win the case at hand by agreeing that his executive discretion to issue or withhold commissions was constitutionally
unlimited. In so doing, it also staked out a general power of the
court to determine, by its ultimate role as constitutional umpire, the boundaries within which that unfettered political discretion could be exercised. Within the context of this paper, I
will be using the term judicial review to connote a U.S. style
Supreme Court power to review the constitutionality of
decisions.
In this paper, I will argue that the Court does in fact currently possess powers of judicial review, but that these are very
limited with respect to binding Chapter VII Council decisions. I
will support my argument by examining four possible sources of
power for the Court: the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter the Charter); the Statute of the International Court of
Justice (hereinafter the Statute); the negotiating history, or
travaux pr6paratoires of the Charter; and finally the relevant
Court decisions and opinions on the subject. I will then discuss
the question of whether the Court should possess stronger powers of review. While related to the existence of a review power,
this question is in fact a separate issue, a point often missed in
analyses of judicial review. In this discussion, I will examine
possible alternatives to judicial review, problems with its implementation, and what scope an increased power should have.
12

Id.

13

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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SOURCES OF JuDicIAL REVIEW

Charterof the United Nations

Chapter XIV of the Charter deals specifically with powers
attributed to the Court; therefore, this a good place to begin a
search for a power of judicial review. Article 92 states that the
Court shall be the principal judicial organ of the U.N., and shall
function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which will be
examined separately. By virtue of Article 94(1), members of the
U.N. 14 each undertake to comply with any decision by the Court
to which it is a party. Other provisions in Chapter XIV entitle
members to use other international tribunals, and entitle the
Council, the General Assembly (hereinafter the Assembly), or
an advisory opinion from the
other U.N. agencies to request
15
Court on any legal question.
It is apparent that no judicial review power is directly attributed to the Court in Chapter XIV of the Charter. However,
it has been argued that the term 'principal judicial organ' in Article 92 might imply a power of judicial review if most states
agree that there should be a judicial body with the authority to6
examine the validity of acts of other organs of government.'
Such agreement would be most likely to come from states which
have some domestic judicial body with powers of judicial review,
either decentralized in courts of general jurisdiction, as in the
U.S., or centralized in constitutional courts, as in France. It is
possible that the U.S. and a European country such as France
might interpret the Charter differently. The U.S. Constitution
does not specifically authorize judicial review. Such power was
arrogated by the U.S. Supreme Court onto itself in Marbury v.
14 "All members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice." U.N. CHARTER art. 93, 1.
15 See U.N. CHARTER art. 95 stating, "[niothing in the present charter shall
prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which
may be concluded in the future."
See also U.N. CHARTER art. 96 which reads:
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. 2.
Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at
any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of
their activities.
16 See Watson, supra note 6, at 5-6.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss2/2
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Madison. By way of contrast, France does have an explicit constitutional review power. With no hard evidence of an international consensus on this point, however, it is unlikely that
Article 92 might be used as a legal basis for judicial review.
With no implicit or explicit power of judicial review in
Chapter XIV, it becomes necessary to examine the possibility
that such a power may be inferred from other Charter provisions. Chapter V of the Charter covers the composition, functions and powers of the Council. The Council is given primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security by virtue of Article 24(1), and is empowered to take decisions binding on all member states by virtue of Article 25.
Much attention has been given to a possible limitation on Council power in the latter provision: "The Members of the United
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." (emphasis
added) 17 Some analysts have suggested that this allows the
Court to disregard decisions of the Council which are not substantively in accordance with the aims of the Charter.' This
would imply that the Court has the power to review Council decisions in order to determine whether or not they are intra
vires.' 9 Although this is an intellectually supportable argument, it does not appear to have been followed in practice, as
will become apparent later in the discussion of the case law. Instead, the phrase 'in accordance with the present Charter' appears to have been interpreted as procedural, referring to the
manner in which the states accept and carry out the decisions.
This does not mean that the Council is left completely free
of restraint in the exercise of its powers. Article 24(2) states
that the Council's power must be exercised " . . . in accordance
20
with the [plurposes and [p]rinciples of the United Nations."
These purposes and principles are expanded upon in Chapter I
of the Charter. In one specific limitation, the purposes of the
U.N. are to be carried out".. . by peaceful means, and in con17 U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
18 See Professor D. Bowett, Lecture at the British Institute for International

and Comparative Law, Judicial and PoliticalFunctions of the Security Council
and the InternationalCourt of Justice (Feb. 17, 1994).
19 Intra vires is defined as an act which is 'within the power' of a person or a
corporation. BLAci's LAw DIcTIONARY 823 (6th ed. 1990).
20 U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1 2.
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formity with the principles of justice and international law
"21

While these general provisions provide for some restraint,
substantive and procedural standards for review of binding
Chapter VII actions are more difficult to pinpoint in the Charter. Article 39 authorizes the Council to determine " . . . the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act

of aggression.

. . ."22

The Council's ability to make such a de-

termination, which is a precondition for any application of sanctions, has in the past been challenged by sanctioned states or
those that felt that the finding of a threat to the peace was inappropriate in the circumstances. 23 However, the determination
of a threat to the peace has more often been viewed as a non24
reviewable competence given to the Council.
It seems that realistically, any implied restraints on the
Council's Chapter VII powers which are found in the Charter
may well have more to do with the interpreter's political yearnings than to do with truly implied restraints. 2 5 The absence of
any specific restraints in a context in which a great deal of
power is assigned to the Council might be interpreted as one of
the strongest arguments against an existing judicial review
function. The possibility remains that a more limited power of
judicial review might be inferred in a situation in which the
Council merely makes recommendations, as opposed to taking
binding decisions. There is a role provided for the Court in a
Chapter VI type situation in Article 36(3) of the Charter: "In
making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should
as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International
Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute
21 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 1.

U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
For e.g., when Rhodesia's minority government unilaterally declared independence from the United Kingdom, both Portugal and South Africa disagreed
with the Council's decision that this constituted a threat to the peace. See S.C.
Res. 221, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966); S.C. Res. 232,
U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (1966).
24 RosALYN HIGGINS, Q.C., THE NEW U.N.: APPEARANCE AND REAIrrY 10 (The
Josephine Onoh Memorial Lecture, Feb. 22, 1993) (transcript available through
The Univ. of Hull Press).
25 Michael Reisman, The Const. Crisis in the UN., 87 AM. J. INV'L L. 93
(1993).
22
23

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss2/2
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of the Court." 26 This article, while giving the Court a role, does
not delegate a specific power of judicial review over recommendations for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
B.

Statute of the InternationalCourt of Justice

The next possible source of a judicial review power to be
examined is the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
The connection between the Charter and the Statute is formalized by Article 92 of the Charter which states that the Statute is
an 'integral' part of the Charter. There appear to be at least
two possible interpretations of what this integral status
means. 2 7 The first is that the Statute is essentially independent of the Charter. The second, and more accepted view, is that
any problems of interpretation are to be solved on the basis that
the Court exists and functions in line with the general existence
and functioning of the U.N. This does not imply a subordinate
status for the Statute, something which was expressly rejected
by not calling it an 'Annex.' 28 Following this argument, the
Statute would certainly be able to support a power of judicial
review even if it does not exist in the Charter. The Statute confirms that the Court is the principal judicial organ of the U.N.
in Article 1. The Court's competence is outlined in Chapter II,
and its jurisdiction specifically addressed in Article 36. However, no mention is made of any power of judicial review. There
does not even appear to be any scope for arguing that such
power may be inferred from any of the provisions.
C. Negotiating History
The Charter has a constitutional character but is also a
treaty and is, therefore, governed by treaty law, specifically the
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (hereinafter the Vienna Convention). 29 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the interpretation of a treaty should rest primarily on
28 U.N. CHARTER

art. 36,

3.

27 See ROSENNE, supra note 8, at 65-68.

28 The fact that the Statute was annexed to the Charter was merely for drafting convenience. ROSENNE, supra note 8, at 67.
29 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, concluded May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
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its text.30 However, Article 32 gives some scope to examine the
negotiating history if the text leaves the meaning "ambiguous
or obscure."3 1 While there is not much question regarding the
Statute, some of the Charter's provisions are arguably ambiguous regarding judicial review, thus allowing an examination of
their negotiating history in order to find out the intention of the

framers.
The travaux pr6paratoires of the Charter present the
strongest arguments against a power of judicial review. 3 2 At
the 1945 San Francisco Conference on International Organization (hereinafter the Conference) to set up the U.N. system, the
proposal to confer the point of preliminary determination of
each organ's competence upon the Court was specifically rejected, allowing instead each organ to interpret its own
33
competence.
At the Conference, Belgium championed the idea of a judicial review power for the Court. 34 The Belgian delegate proposed that:
[a]ny state, party to a dispute brought before the Security Council, shall have the right to ask the Permanent Court of International Justice whether a recommendation or a decision made by
the Council or proposed in it infringes on its essential rights. If
the Court considers that such rights have been disregarded or are
question
threatened, it is for the Council either to reconsider3the
5
or to refer the dispute to the Assembly for decision.
This proposed amendment was to be incorporated into the
Charter's Chapter VI on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes.
The purpose of the First Belgian Amendment according to the
Belgian delegate was to ensure that no state would be obliged to
positive
abandon an essential right of statehood derived from
36
them.
against
ruled
Council
the
if
law
international
30 Id. art. 31.
31 Id. art. 32.
32 For an in depth analysis of the negotiating history on this issue, see Watson, supra note 6, at 8-14.
33 See RicHARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 162 (1986) (concludes for
this reason there is no power of judicial review).
34 Watson, supra, note 6, at 8-14.
35 Doc. 2, G/7(k)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 335, 336 (1945).
38 Doc. 433, 111/2/15, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 47, 48 (1945).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss2/2
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The First Belgian Amendment prompted a great deal of discussion among the drafters. Three states awaiting a place on
the Permanent Council spoke against the amendment, and thus
in their own self-interest. The Soviet delegate voiced his concern that the Security Council should receive the full confidence
of the members of the Organization, and added that there
would be no desire on the part of the Council to infringe on
states' sovereign rights. The proposed Belgian amendment, it
was asserted, would weaken the Council too much. 37 The
American delegate argued that the draft requirement of the
Council to work in accordance with the principles of the Organization and with due regard for the principles of justice and international law was sufficient to keep the Council in line,
especially since states could already appeal to go before the
Court.38 The French delegate argued against a dispersal of responsibilities in the Organization and suggested that the drafting committee ensure to the fullest extent possible that the
39
Council accomplish its task according to law and justice.
South African and British delegates also spoke against the
amendment, for reasons such as an unacceptable delay to the
40
advantage of an aggressor state.
In favor of the amendment, the delegate from Columbia
(not expected to be a permanent council member) pointed out
that having confidence in the Council "should not exclude confidence in the International Court of Justice," and that "no question was more legal than one concerning the essential rights of
4
a state." '
In the end Belgium withdrew the amendment. However,
this was not because the framers had reached a consensus that
a judicial review power was unnecessary with regard to binding
Chapter VII Security Council decisions. 4 2 It was withdrawn because under what was to become Chapter VI, the Council's
power to recommend a solution to disputes would be merely advisory and not possess any obligatory effect.
37 Id. at 49.

38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Doc. 498, 111/2/19, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 65, 66 (1945).
41 Doc. 433, supra note 36, at 50.
42

Watson, supra note 6, at 11.
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Belgium later raised the issue again in the form of the Second Belgian Amendment. The Belgian delegate argued, on May
29, 1945, that the Committee on Legal Problems should determine a proper interpretative organ for certain parts of the
Charter, with the Court being an obvious possibility.43 After
debate in which it was variously suggested that the Assembly,
44
the Court, or ad hoc committees of experts could fill this role,
the Belgian proposal was rejected. While it may be argued that
the idea of judicial review was not rejected per se, it was clearly
rejected as an established procedure. 45 A subcommittee of the
Committee on Legal Problems prepared a report concluding
that no provision regarding interpretation of powers was necessary in the Charter. Instead it encouraged organs in conflict to
seek advisory opinions from the Court, and states to bring disputes before the Court or to use ad hoc committees or conferences to find solutions. The report concluded that if an
interpretation by an organ or committee is "not generally acceptable it will be without binding force." 46
A situation envisaged in the report in which the Court reviews only certain disputes referred to it while the day to day
disputes are dealt with by the organs concerned is not incompatible with judicial review. It is in fact somewhat similar to
the decentralized system in the U.S. Thus, it could be argued
that the text and travaux pr6paratoires of the Charter do not
rule out all forms of judicial review, but suggest that the Court
has the power to ignore a 'generally unacceptable' interpretation of the Charter by another organ. 47 However, this implicit
endorsement of a general standard of review was not elaborated
upon. In practice there could be some confusion as to how the
Court might determine that an interpretation of an organ's
powers was not generally acceptable. There is perhaps the implication that a majority of states would have to reject an
interpretation.
While the Charter and the travaux pr6paratoires do not
conclusively resolve the issue, they certainly do not favor a
43

Doc. 664, IV/2/33, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 633 (1945).

" Id.
Doc. 843, IV/2/37, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 645 (1945).
46 Doc. 933, IV/2/42 (2), 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 709, 710 (1945).
47 Watson, supra note 6, at 14.
45

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss2/2
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power of judicial review, rejecting it in an institutionalized
form. Further insight into the issue may be gained by an examination of how it has developed in practice.
D.

The Development of JudicialReview in Case Law

The Vienna Convention provides that the interpretation of
treaties should take into account "[a]ny subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation." 48 Thus, the next step
in the search for a power of judicial review is to examine any
relevant decisions of the Court, for states themselves may have
established judicial review through their acquiescence in the
Court's de facto use of such a power. Marbury v. Madison is a
precedent, albeit from a national jurisdiction, for a situation in
which the Court might size a power of judicial review through
one of its own decisions.
1.

49
The Certain Expenses Case

In 1961, the Assembly requested an advisory opinion from
the Court on whether member states were responsible for expenses relating to U.N. operations in the Congo in 1960-61 and
in the Middle East in the 1950s. 50 This was because Article
17(2) of the Charter provides that the "expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the
General Assembly." 5 1 The legal question was whether the expenses in the Congo and the Middle East fit within the meaning
of this Article.
The opinion of the Court in this case has often been cited in
support of the view that each organ within the U.N. system
must determine its own jurisdiction. 52 The Court expressly rejected the idea that it might possess a power of judicial review:
48 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, supra note 29, art. 31 (3)(b).
49 Certain Expenses of the U.N., 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20) (hereinafter
CERTAIN EXPENSES CASE].

50 G.A. Res. 1731, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/
5062 (1961).
2.
51 U.N. CHARTER art. 17,
52 See Bernhard Graefrath, Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court: The
Libyan Case, 4 EuR. J. INT'L L. 184, 201 (1993).
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In the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for
determining the validity of even a legislative or governmental act,
but no analogous procedure is to be found in the structure of the
United Nations. Proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the
International Court of Justice were not accepted; the opinion
which the Court is in the course of rendering is an advisory opinion. As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each organ53 must, in the
first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction.
Despite this apparently clear statement, there is some support for the view that it is not necessary to interpret this passage as a complete rejection of judicial review by the Court. It
has been argued that talk of determining jurisdiction in the first
place leaves open the possibility that there is a second place,
which might be the domain of the Court. 54 It has also been suggested that the denial of ultimate authority does not mean the
55
denial of all authority to interpret the Charter.
Stronger arguments in favor ofjudicial review highlight the
Court's referral to a rejected French amendment to the Assembly resolution calling for the Court to decide first whether the
expenditures authorized by the Council and the Assembly were
in conformity with the Charter. Despite the fact that this request was not sent to the Court in the final version of the resolution,5 6 the Court reserved for itself the power to decide if the
expenditures were authorized in conformity with the Charter if
it so wished. 57 In so doing, the Court asserted a power of judiCertain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168.
Graefrath, supra note 52, at 201.
55 See Watson, supra note 6, at 16. Watson argues that this may signify that
the Court's opinion would only be binding on those parties before it, just as its
decisions in contentious cases are binding only on those parties before it. Watson
supra note 6, at 16.
56 The final resolution asked whether,
"... the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions... relating to U.N. operations in the Congo undertaken in pursuance of the Security
Council resolutions . .. and General Assembly resolutions ... and the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions ... relating to the
operations of the United Nations Emergency Force undertaken in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions... constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the
United Nations?"
Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 153.
57 CertainExpenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 157.
53
54
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cial review in a situation in which the Assembly had clearly
opted against offering such power to the Court.5 8 This apparent contradiction between the words and actions of the majority
of the Court has left some room for debate.
Further support for judicial review is found in the Court's
statement that where U.N. action is for the fulfillment of one of
the Conference's stated purposes, "the presumption is that such
action is not ultra vires .... "59 This would appear to suggest
that the Court reserved for itself a right of judicial review when
the Council is not acting to fulfill one of its stated purposes, the
action thus being ultra vires. This 'presumption of validity' has
since served as the Court's standard of review, replacing the
drafters' suggested standard of 'without binding force if not generally acceptable.' 60
In the foregoing analysis, all arguments in favor of judicial
review have been implied from statements of the Court majority, going against their explicit views on the issue. However,
Judge Bustamente in his separate opinion categorically rejected
any possibility of a complete absence of judicial review, stating
that, "[itcannot be maintained that the resolutions of any organ of the United Nations are not subject to review: that would
amount to declaring the pointlessness of the Charter or its absolute subordination to the judgment, always fallible, of the
61
organs."
In the separate opinion of Judge Morelli, it was directly argued that the Court should have a narrow power of review to
deal with questions of the validity of the acts of the U.N.:
It is exclusively for the Court to decide, in the process of its reasoning, what are the questions which have to be solved in order to
answer the question submitted to it. While... the organ requesting the opinion is quite free as regards the formulation of the
question to be submitted to the Court, it cannot, once that question has been defined, place any limitations on the Court as regards the logical processes to be followed in answering it. That
58 Watson, supra note 6, at 15.
59 Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168; Ultra Vires is defined as an act
performed 'without any authority' to act on the subject. BLAces LAw DICIoNARY
1522 (6th ed. 1990).
60 Watson, supra note 6, at 17.
61 Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 304 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Bustamente).
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organ cannot, therefore, exclude the possibility of the Court's
dealing with a question which the Court might consider it necessary to answer in order to perform the task entrusted to it ....
Any limitation of this kind would be unacceptable because it
would prevent the Court from performing its task in a logically
correct way ....
Therefore, even according to the request for advisory opinion,
of the
the Court is free to consider or not consider the question
62
conformity of the resolutions with the Charter ....
Judge Morelli's analysis focused on judicial review in the
sense of whether the proper organ had exercised power in any
particular case. This type of review differs from the type most
commonly discussed, as discussed here, in which the correct organ has exercised but possibly exceeded its own powers. Judge
Morelli's support of a Court power to review a decision in order
to establish whether it was taken by the correct body today
probably benefits from a certain consensus. In fact, it is arguable that the question presented in the Namibia Case6 3 fits into
this category of review, the Court deciding whether or not the
Council was the correct organ to revoke the mandate as it was
held by the Assembly.
Thus, a certain amount of individual support may be found
in favor of a power of judicial review in the Certain Expenses
Case, particularly in a situation in which there is a question of
which organ may properly exercise the power. However, support for review power over decisions by the correct organ must
be considered to be tempered by the outright rejection of such a
power by the Court's majority.
2.

The Namibia Case

Following World War I, the League of Nations authorized
South Africa to administer a Mandate for Namibia (known at
the time as South-West Africa). The system of apartheid imposed there by South Africa was held by the Court in 1950 to be
62 Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 217 (separate opinion of Judge
Morelli).
63

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of S. Ar. in

Namib. (S. W. Afr.) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia].
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in violation of its duties in the terms of the Mandate. 64 Despite
this Advisory Opinion, South Africa continued to illegally impose apartheid upon its neighbor. Following the General Assembly's lead, 65 the Council declared that South Africa had
violated the Mandate, declared the Mandate to be terminated,
and ordered South Africa to withdraw from South-West Africa.6 6 The Council then requested an advisory opinion from

the Court on the legal consequences for states of South Africa's
continued presence in South-West Africa, notwithstanding
Council Resolution 270.67
During its consideration of the Namibia case, the Court observed that both South Africa and France had argued in the
General Assembly that the Assembly's resolutions terminating
the Mandate were ultra vires. 68 The Court stated that this argument would also apply to Council resolutions. On the issue of
its ability to review the validity of these resolutions, the Court
pronounced:
[u]ndoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned. The question of the validity or
conformity with the Charter of General Assembly resolution
2145 (XXI) or of related Security Council resolutions does not
form the subject of the request for advisory opinion. However, in
the exercise of its judicial function and since objections have
been advanced the Court, in the course of its reasoning, will conany legal consequences
sider these objections before determining
69
resolutions.
those
from
arising
In the course of its normal judicial procedure, the Court
employed this practice by reviewing whether the Council reso64 See Int'l Status of S.W. Afr., 1950 I.C.J. 128, 134 (July 11). The Court rejected South Africa's argument that they were no longer bound by the terms of the
mandate as that had been established by the League of Nations which was no
longer in existence.
65 G.A. Res. 2145, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
66 S.C. Res. 264, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES1264 (1969); S.C.
Res. 269, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/269 (1969); S.C. Res. 276, U.N.
SCOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. SIRES/276 (1970).
6 S.C. Res. 284, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1550th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/284
(1970).
68 Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 45.
69

Id.
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lution was in conformity with the Charter. The Court concluded that "the decisions made by the Security Council ...
were adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles of
the Charter and in accordance with its Articles 24 and 25."70

After ruling that the Council's acts were valid and in accordance with the Charter, the Council concluded that South Africa
had not acted in accordance with the Council's resolutions and
that other states were bound to follow these resolutions and not
71
recognize South Africa's occupation of Namibia.
In rendering its opinion, the Court appears to have plainly
contradicted itself. Despite its categorical initial rejection of a
judicial review power, the Court proceeded to affirm a competence to decide whether a Council decision is in conformity with
the Charter when this arises in the normal course of its judicial
function.
In his separate opinion, Judge Petren argued that the
Court has the responsibility to review the validity of the acts in
question, because "[slo long as the validity of the resolutions
upon which Resolution 276 (1970) [was] based [had] not been
established, it is clearly impossible for the Court to pronounce
"..."72 Underlining the need for
on [its] legal consequences .
some sort of judicial review, Judge Dillard stated, "[iut may not
be presumptuous to suggest that as a political matter it is not in
the long-range interest of the United Nations to appear to be
reluctant to have its resolutions stand the test of legal validity
when it calls upon a court to determine issues to which this validity is related."73 Perhaps the most ringing endorsement of
judicial review came from Judge Fitzmaurice in his dissent in
which he directly attacked the validity of Council's
resolutions.74
In opposition to any power of judicial review for the Court
Judge Nervo stated that, "the Court will have to assume the
validity of... Security Council and General Assembly ... [resolutions] and that ... [tihe Court should not assume powers of

judicial review of the action of principal organs of the United
70 Id. at 53.
71 Id. at 54-56.
72 Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 131 (seperate opinion of Judge Petren).
73 Id. at 151-52 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
74 Id. at 292-93 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
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Nations without specific request to that effect." 75 Even this
leaves some room for judicial review at the request of one of the
U.N. organs.
The Court's opinion in Namibia reflects the view that once
the Court is asked about the effect of a U.N. organ's resolution,
it cannot avoid considering whether the resolution is valid in
the first place. However, despite the clear support for judicial
review expressed by some of the judges, most of this came in the
form of general statements. With no strict legal basis given for
such a power, it remains unclear at best, whether such a power
exists.
3.

Lockerbie (ProvisionalMeasures)

Lockerbie is an important case because it coincided with the
revival of the Council and the breakdown of the political checks
and balances that had operated during the Cold War. It was
also triggered by an innovative use of the Charter concept of
'threat to the peace.' It is considered very significant in that it
is the first time a significant portion of the Court has intimated
that it could exercise a power of judicial review in contentious
cases. This decision more than any other source has fueled the
recent debate on the existence of judicial review.
On December 21, 1988, a bomb planted on Pan Am flight
103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 258 people on
board and at least 15 on the ground. Investigations into the
disaster led the U.S. and the U.K. to the conclusion that two
Libyan intelligence agents were involved. These two states requested the surrender of the agents7 6 but Libya refused. The
Council responded on January 21, 1992, by adopting Resolution
731 calling on Libya 'to provide a full and effective response' to
requests for surrender. 77 The resolution affirmed, " . . . the
right of all States, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and relevant principles of international law, to protect
Id. at 105 (separate opinion of Judge Nervo).
See the Declaration of the U.S., Fr. & Gr. Brit. on Terrorism, 31 I.L.M. 723
(1992) (demanding surrender of the agents).
77 S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731
(1992).
75

76
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their nationals from acts of international terrorism that constitute threats to international peace and security .... "78
Libya's initial response to Resolution 731 conditioned compliance on the establishment by the Secretary-General of a committee of impartial judges to lead the inquiry into the charges
against the two Libyan suspects. 7 9 In addition, the accused
state demanded that the suspects be extradited not to the U.S.
or the U.K., but to a third party. Libya later changed its argument, however, stating that its domestic law forbade the extradition of its own nationals and that compliance was, therefore,
not possible.8 0 If such a prohibition indeed exists in Libyan law,
it begs the question of why this argument was not advanced
immediately.
On March 3, 1992, Libya filed separate suits against the
U.S. and the U.K. with the Court, seeking a judgment that both
these states had violated the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Sabotage) of 197181 by continuing to attempt to gain custody
over the two Libyian nationals. The applicant claimed that the
Court possessed jurisdiction to hear the case by virtue of Article
14 of the Montreal Convention, arguing that as the parties had
been unable to arrange an arbitration, recourse to the Court
82
was open.
78 Id.

79 For details of Libya's response, see the letter from Ibrahim M. Bishari, Secretary of the People's Comm. for Foreign Liaison and Intl Cooperation, to the Secretary-Gen., reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 737 (Feb. 27, 1992).
80 Letter from Ibrahim M. Bishari, Secretary of the People's Comm. for Foreign Liaison and Int'l Cooperation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to the Secretary-Gen., reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 739 (Mar. 2, 1992).
81 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
82 Id. art. XV, 24 U.S.T. at 572.
Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through
negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration.
If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties
are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those
parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
Id. art. XIV (1), 24 U.S.T. at 572.
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Libya claimed that the Council resolutions ordering extradition were ultra vires and, therefore, invalid because they disregarded Article 7 of the Montreal Convention. This provision
embodies a fundamental principle of international law, aut
dedere aut judicare, which allows the state of nationality of an
alleged offender the choice either to extradite the alleged offender for trial in a foreign jurisdiction or to choose to have its
own authorities prosecute. Ironically, this provision was included in the Montreal Convention expressly at the request of
the western states which drafted and negotiated it.83 Libya as-

serted that it had already taken measures necessary to comply
with the Montreal Convention by submitting the case for prosecution to its own competent authorities, 84 and asked "the Court
to indicate ... provisional measures to enjoin [both states] from

taking any action against Libya calculated to coerce or compel
Libya to surrender the accused individuals to any jurisdiction
outside of Libya ....

"85

Libya also asked the Court to find that the Council had exceeded its Charter-delegated powers by infringing or threatening to infringe through the use of economic, air and other
the rights consanctions, the enjoyment and the exercise of
86
Convention.
Montreal
the
by
ferred on Libya
Three days after the close of legal hearings, but before the
Court had reached a decision, the Council increased the pressure on Libya. Resolution 748, adopted March 31, 1992, and
taken expressly under Chapter VII powers, imposed universal
and mandatory commercial and diplomatic sanctions on Libya,
effective April 15, to secure compliance with the surrender order.8 7 In support of the resolution, the U.S. and the U.K. both
argued that Libya could not conduct a fair trial because it was
purportedly involved in the terrorism.88
The respondents here argued that the requisite negotiations to set up an arbitration had not taken place and that the Court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction
until the six month period specified in the provision had ended.
83 McWhinney, supra note 4, at 263-64.
84 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. at 5.
s6 Id. at 8.
86

Id. at 7.

S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
748 (1992).
8 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. at 29 (separate opinion of Judge
Shahabudden). During the course of the orders, however, Judge Shahabuddeen
87
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The Court, the composition of which was altered to take account of the parties to the action, issued orders on April 14,
1992, rejecting Libya's request for preliminary relief by a vote of
11-5.89 It ruled that whatever the situation prior to Council resolution 748, "the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal
Convention... [were not] appropriate for protection by the indication of provisional measures: ...

an indication of the meas-

ures requested by Libya would be likely to impair the rights
which appear prima facie to be enjoyed by the [two respondent
states] by virtue of Security Council Resolution 748 (1992)
.
*"90 The majority declined to rule on the U.S. contention
that because the Montreal Convention called for a six month
delay before submission to the Court, there was a manifest lack
of jurisdiction to allow interim measures. 9 ' In all there were
eleven written opinions, reflecting the novelty of the issues in
question. This proliferation from the bench has stimulated the
most debate over the issue of judicial review since the framers
originally tackled the question in 1945. While the Court's order
was only an award of interim measures and not some more general statement on the relationship between the Court and the
Council,9 2 it is still worthwhile noting the different views
raised.
The Court brought the question of judicial review into full
relief with the separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. After
pointed out that the official announcements of those governments made it clear
that they could not provide a fair trial as guilt has already been determined by
them as States. Id. at 31.
89 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K), 1992 I.C.J. at 15. The composition of the Court
was altered to take account of the parties to the action. The President of the
Court, Judge Jennings, was a U.K. national and as such prevented from fdfilling
his presidential duties by virtue of Article 32 (1) of the Rules of the Court. Libya,
unrepresented on the Court, was able to name an ad-hoc judge by virtue of Article
31 (2) of the Court's Statute.
90Id.
91 Id. Some of the judges did, however, consider the issue in their separate
opinions. Judge Ni accepted the American argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction until the expiration of the six months dictated in the Montreal Convention.
Had there been jurisdiction for the Court, however, Judge Ni suggested that the
Court would have had to consider the matter regardless of whether it was before
the Council at the same time. See Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K), 1992 I.C.J. at 23 (separate opinion of Judge Ni).
92 HiGaiNs, supra note 24, at 10.
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citing Namibia as support for the principle that Council resolutions are entitled to a presumption of validity, he stated:
[tihe question now raised by Libya's challenge to the validity of
resolution 748 (1992) is whether a decision of the Security Council
may override the legal rights of States, and, if so, whether there
are any limitations on the power of the Council to char-acterize a
situation as one justifying the making of a decision entailing such
consequences. Are there any limits to the Council's powers of appreciation? In the equilibrium of forces underpinning the structure of the United Nations within the evolving international
order, is there any conceivable point beyond which a legal issue
may properly arise as to the competence of the Security Council to
produce such over-riding results? If there are limits, what are
those limits and what body, if other than93the Security Council, is
competent to say what those limits are?
A similar issue was raised by Judge Weeramantry in his
dissent, "does.. .the Security Council discharge its variegated
functions free of all limitations, or is there a circumscribing
boundary of norms or principles within which its responsibilities are to be discharged?" 9 4 Both Judges were obviously concerned with the need to enforce limits on the power of the
Council. In fact, both majority and dissenting opinions in Lockerbie seem to express sentiments that there are limits to the
Council's powers and that they cannot be left exclusively to the
Council itself to interpret. Judge Weeramantry found that an
examination of the travaux prdparatoires of the Charter clearly
provided for some limitation in that the Council's powers must
be exercised in accordance with the purposes and principles
95
found in Chapter 1.
93 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K), 1992 I.C.J. at 32 (separate opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen).
94 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. at 61 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Weeramantry).
95 Id. at 65.
The history of the U.N. Charter thus corroborates the view that a clear limitation on the plentitude of the Security Council's powers is that those powers must be exercised in accordance with the well-established principles of
international law. It is true this limitation must be restrictively interpreted
and is confined only to the principles and objects which appear in Chapter I
of the Charter .... The restriction, nevertheless, exists and constitutes an
important principle of law in the interpretation of the U.N. Charter.
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Some of the judges attempted to couch the issues raised by
Lockerbie in terms which would avoid the need to come up with
difficult answers. Cognizant of the possible conflict between the
Court and the Council, acting President Oda stated in his declaration that he would have preferred to avoid the problems stemming there from by making the ruling on grounds of sovereign
rights. He suggested that while no state is obliged to extradite
its nationals unless there is a treaty obligation to that effect,
extradition may be sought on terms of international criminal
jurisdiction, therefore, making the question one of protection of
sovereign rights under general international law and not one of
Libya's rights under the Convention. 96 Judge Shahabuddeen
also attempted to avoid any conflict between the organs by considering the problem to be a conflict not between the Court and
the Council, but between Libya's obligations under the Charter
and the Convention. 9 7 It should be noted that this argument
reflects an assumption that there are relevant obligations under
the Convention, however, whether this is applicable law remains to be decided on the merits.
It is possible to infer that some judges, albeit tentatively,
did go so far as to indicate that under certain circumstances, a
decision by the Council might be declared invalid by the Court.
Acting President Oda stated that "a decision of the Security
Council, properly taken in the exercise of its competence, cannot
be summarily reopened. . . ."98 This stipulation that the Council act within its competence could be taken to imply some leeway for Court review if the Council acted outside this
competence. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bedjaoui asserted
that a resolution which prevents the Court from exercising its
judicial function would give cause for consideration regarding
its lawfulness. 99 He did not, however, go on to give terms of
reference for what exactly the Court's judicial functions might
be. This lack of specificity is a problem that reappears time and
again in the arguments advanced in favor of judicial review.
One author has argued that the Libyian application left the
Court with three possible options, the first two of which would
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. at 18 (declaration of Judge Oda).
97 Id. at 29 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
98 Id. at 17 (declaration of Judge Oda).
99 Id. at 44 (dissenting opinion of Judge Bedjaoui).
96
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mean the implicit assumption of some form of judicial review
power. 10 0 The first choice was to hold ". . . that the sanctions

ordered by Resolution 748 should be suspended until such time
as the Court ascertained, at the merits stage, that Libya's claim
was groundless."1° 1 The second option was to hold that Libya
had not established a sufficient case of mala fides or ultra vires
at this stage, and therefore ".

.

. there were no grounds upon

which the Court could order such interim relief."10 2 The third
option would have been to hold ".

.

. that no relief would be

forthcoming at any stage of the proceedings if granting that relief would require the Court to make a finding that a chapter
10 3
VII decision of the Council exceeded its lawful authority."
This last option of rejecting any possibility of judicial review relies upon the binding nature of Council resolutions under Charter Article 25.
The proponent of this argument then asserts that the Court
appears to have elected the second option and in so doing affirmed a power of judicial review in such situations. 0 4 It is at
best unclear as to how this decision was reached. A straight
forward analysis of the decision, in which the Court relies on
Article 25 without subjecting Resolution 748 to any kind of review, would seem to indicate that in fact it is the third option
which was actually chosen by the Court.
It has been similarly argued that, as in Marbury, the Court
accedes to the power of the political branch but does so not by
10 5
abstaining but rather by using its decision-making powers.
The Council's action in imposing sanctions is judged intra vires
because the majority appear to agree that Article 103 of the
Charter prevails over any rights Libya might have under the
terms of the Montreal Convention, and thus frees the Council to
apply sanctions as a suitable remedy in an exercise of its Chapter VII powers. Following this argument, the possibility remains that if Libya had come up with ".

.

. a more general

ground of ultra vires - [for instance], that a coercive demand for
100 Thomas Franck, The "Powersof Appreciation:?Who is the Ultimate Guardian of U.N. Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 521 (1992).
101 Id.
102

Id.

103 Id.
104
105

Id.

Id.
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extradition of a state's own national 'could be deemed contrary
to protection of sovereign rights under general international
law' -then, ... "there might have been another decision by the
10 6
Court.
...

This conclusion does not seem to mesh with the facts. The
majority opinion did not consider whether the Council resolution might be ultra vires, but instead just relied on it, holding
that the parties are obliged to carry out the Council decision by
virtue of Article 25. The idea of a presumption of validity for
Council resolutions is supported explicitly by Judge Shahabuddeen.' 0 7 At least one other author clearly asserts that the Court
".. . did not assert judicial competence to determine whether

purported legislative acts or actions of the Security Council
complied with the constitutional law of the United Nations
Charter .... "1 08o
In fact, despite drawing attention to the issue of judicial
review, most of the judges stopped short of explicitly endorsing
such a power. Judge Weeramantry, clearly desirous of some
limitation on the Council's power, would not claim this role for
the Court, stating that it has not been vested with a review
power as the highest courts have in some domestic
jurisdictions. 10 9
Overall, the interim measures decision appears to represent an attempt by the Court to balance its judicial functions
with the Council's political power. Judge Bedjaoui, in dissent,
indicated that there should be a degree of balancing taking
place, and that the Court should not be displaced from exercising its primary judicial functions. Realistically, in Chapter VII
cases this balance appears to have been struck in favor of the
Council. Judge Lachs states that "[w]hile the Court has the vocation applying international law as a universal law, operating
both within and outside the United Nations, it is bound to re-

106

Id. at 522.

107 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K), 1992 I.C.J. at 28 (separate opinion of Judge

Shahabuddeen).
108 McWhinney, supra note 4, at 270.
109 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K), 1992 I.C.J. at 55 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Weeramantry).
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spect, as part of that law, the binding decisions of the Security
1 10
Council."
Judicial Review advocates have suggested that Judge
Lachs' choice of the word 'respect,' instead of a phrase such as
'defer to,' implies that a fair balancing between the organs is
taking place."' Such an argument seems to ignore the very
basis for the Court's decision which rests ultimately on the
existence of a Council decision under Chapter VII, preempting,
at least for the duration of its operation, potential judicial action based on the Montreal Convention. The Court supported
its decision on two formal bases. First, Council decisions taken
under Chapter VII are accepted by member states in advance as
obligations by virtue of Article 25 of the Charter. Second, obligations under the Charter prevail over obligations under any
other international agreement (in this case, the Montreal Convention) by virtue of Charter Article 103. This formalistic approach " . . . precludes, in blanket fashion, the exercise of
judicial jurisdiction whenever and simply because the Council is
in a Chapter VII decision mode."" 2 Following the argument
that Articles 103 and 25 of the Charter must always trump
rights from other agreements, the only way for the other rights
to survive would be if they reappeared in3 a situation in which
the Chapter VII decision is terminated."
It might be contended that Article 103 only trumps Libya's
rights for the purposes of interim measures. However, there
does not appear to be much support for this argument. It was in
fact previously brought up by the U.S. in the Nicaragua Case
(Merits) 114 but rejected by the Court.
The majority ruling would appear to be a solid argument
against the view discussed earlier, that judicial review powers
110 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K), 1992 I.C.J. at 26 (separate opinion of Judge
Lachs).
111 See Franck, supra note 100, at 522.
112 Reisman, supra note 25, at 90.
113 Reisman, supra note 25, at 90. Reisman cloaks the same argument in different terms, suggesting that the Court was not shouldered aside by a Chapter VII
decision, as asserted by Judge Shahabuddeen in his separate opinion, but rather
that the applicant state loses whatever conventional or customary legal basis it
may have had for making its application before the Chapter VII decision. Reisman, supra note 25, at 90.
114 Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicar., 1992 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter NicaraguaCase].
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are based in Article 25 of the Charter. This argument interprets the Article 25 requirement that Council decisions be "...
in accordance with the present Charter..

. " as a substantive

requirement, rather than a procedural one. In fact, only the ad
hoc judge appointed by Libya actually followed this line of reasoning, declaring the Council Resolution 748 imposing sanctions as invalid for violating Libya's right of sovereignty under
Charter Article 2(7). Judge El-Kosheri argued that Article 25
cannot render binding a decision which is substantively not in
accordance with the present Charter. 115 This argument applied
to the case at hand because it is the Charter, not the Council,
which prevails over inconsistent treaty law. None of the other
judges went so far as to draw this conclusion.
After determining that Charter obligations prevailed over
those in the Convention, the Court added that at that stage it
was not "called upon to determine definitively the legal effect of
the Security Council Resolution 748 (1992)... ."116 It has been
suggested that the implication of this is that when the Court
deals with the merits of a case it may determine the legal effects
of Council Resolutions. 1 7 It would seem that a more straightforward interpretation would be that the Court will later review, "on the merits, what exactly was the legal effect of the
substantive provisions of the resolution ..

"..-118

This is alto-

gether something other than determining whether the Council
was or was not entitled to decide that a threat to the peace
existed.
While the Court's competence to review Chapter VII decisions appears to be suspect at best, the balance of power with
regard to Council Resolutions which are based in Chapter VI is
far less clear. The Court decision was based on Resolution 748
and carried with it the implication that had the Council relied
solely on Resolution 731, which was cast very much in the recommendatory language of Chapter VI, this would not have been
enough to prevail over treaty-based Court jurisdiction. Unfor115 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. at 99 (dissenting opinion of Judge ElKosheri).
116 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K), 1992 I.C.J. at 15.
117 See Graefrath, supra note 52, at 185. See also Gerald McGinley, The ICJ's
Decision in the Lockerbie Cases, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 577, 582 (1992).
118 HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 11.
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tunately, this possibility was not delved into in sufficient detail
to draw any hard conclusions.
This examination of separate opinions and declarations
would be incomplete without a passing but important reference
to the joint declaration of Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume
and Aguilar. In this declaration the judges show unified support for the majority decision to rely on Resolution 748 without
considering whether it was intra vires Council powers. This
only serves to reinforce the conclusion that when the Council
acts under its Chapter VII powers, the Court lacks a power of
judicial review. While key questions were raised regarding the
existence of and need for a judicial review power, there was no
ringing endorsement of such a power. Instead, it appears that
the majority, while mindful of the dangers of an unchecked
Council, came closer to a reaffirmation of the idea of a "presumption of validity" for Chapter VII Council resolutions." 9
While the power to review non-binding Council decisions may
be the first step on the road to arrogating a much stronger judicial review power onto the Court, it would be inaccurate to portray Lockerbie as the international equivalent of Marbury.
4.

120
Bosnia v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

In March, 1993, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
instituted proceedings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro; hereinafter "Yugoslavia") seeking
provisional measures from the Court in order to stop what it
claimed to be acts of genocide on the part of Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina contended that a series of acts between April,
1992 and the date of Application were committed at the direction of, the behest of, and with the assistance of the government
of Yugoslavia that amounted to genocide. The Applicant asked
the Court to indicate provisional measures which would end the
genocidal acts and allow Bosnia-Herzegovina to seek and receive support from other states.
On April 8th, the Court issued its order calling for a cessa12 1
tion of any genocidal acts and indicating further measures.
119 Watson, supra note 6, at 28.
120 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Bosnia v. Yugo., 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 8).
121

Id.
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However, due to a lack of progress in halting the violence, on
July 27, 1993, Bosnia-Herzegovina filed another request for further measures, leading to a second order of the Court on Sep-

tember 13,

1993.122

One of the central issues considered by the Court was
Council Resolution 713 (1991), which imposed an arms embargo
upon Yugoslavia. Acting under its Chapter VII powers, the
Council had decided:
[t]hat all states shall, for the purpose of establishing peace and
stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise
the Secretary-General and the
following consultation between
23
Government of Yugoslavia.'
Bosnia-Herzegovina argued that, as they had ceased to be a
part of Yugoslavia, this embargo should not apply to them.
They argued further that it should not affect their inherent
right to self-defense under Charter Article 51 and customary international law. They submitted, "[tihat the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina must have the means 'to prevent' the
commission of acts of genocide against its own people as re12 4
quired by Article I of the Genocide Convention."
This submission by Bosnia-Herzegovina gave rise to some
commentary relevant to the issue of judicial review. In his separate opinion, ad hoc Judge Lauterpacht stated that the request
for access to the means to prevent the commission of acts of genocide was essentially a request for the Court to challenge the
validity of the Council resolution. This was particularly true in
light of the fact that the Council had on a number of later occasions reaffirmed the embargo, thus interpreting it to include
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 125 Acknowledging that the embargo
worked unequally, as the Serbs still had access to the arms
stocks of the former Yugoslav national army, Judge Lauterpacht, nonetheless, asserted that the Court does not have the
122 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures Order (hereinafter Bosnia v. Yugo.), 1993
I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13).
6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1992).
123 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
124 Bosnia v. Yugo., 1993 I.C.J. at 332.
125 Bosnia v. Yugo., 1993 I.C.J. at 438 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
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right to substitute its discretion for that of the Council in determining the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the
1 26
peace or an act of aggression.
Judge Lauterpacht also raised the issue of the Court's ability to review a Council decision which conflicts with a principle
of jus cogens.127 The ad hoc Court member carefully distinguished the case at hand from that of Lockerbie, in which the
decision of the Council had prevailed over any treaty obligation
by virtue of Article 103. The distinguishing factor in Bosnia v.
Yugoslavia was the fact that the prohibition against genocide
has long been established as a principle of jus cogens.' 2 8 Because the concept of jus cogens is superior to both treaty and
customary international law, the relief offered in Lockerbie by
Article 103 did not apply. Insofar as Resolution 713 unwittingly
supported the perpetration of genocide contrary to an established rule ofjus cogens, Judge Lauterpacht suggested that the
decision might become legally null and void. With regard to the
elimination of the arms embargo vis-k-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina,
he went as far as stating that he would be prepared to indicate
the following provisional measure: "t]hat as between the Applicant and the Respondent the continuing validity of the embargo in its bearing on the Applicant has become a matter of
doubt requiring further consideration by the Security
29
Council."
While going so far as to indicate a potential power of review
for the Court, Judge Lauterpacht stopped short of any arrogation of power, structuring his suggested measure in terms
which would allow the Council to do the actual reviewing.
While the majority of the Court did not make any statement
regarding judicial competence to review a Council decision
which conflicts with a principle of jus cogens, Judge Lauterpacht's commentary may well be an indication of one direction
in which the Court may increase its powers in the future.

126

Id. at 439.

127

The termjus cogens connotes a rule of law which is peremptory because it is

binding irrespective of the will of the individual parties. ENCYCLOPAEDIC
ARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (1986).
128
129

DICTION-

Bosnia v. Yugo., 1993 I.C.J. at 440.
Id. at 442.
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SHOULD THERE BE A POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?

Although it seems possible to conclude that the Court currently possesses at most a limited power of judicial review,
there is little doubt that there has been an recent trend in support of increasing such a power. As already shown, this support
is found in the obiter dicta of existing case law and in academic
commentary. Support may also be found in other places, such
as legal reform bodies. For example, the issue of whether there
should be a power of judicial review over Chapter VII decisions
was brought up before the International Law Commission by
Professor Alain Pellet in May 1992.130 He stated that the Court
should always satisfy itself as to the legal validity of a Council
decision, and that these decisions should at least comply with
the norms ofjus cogens and should not be contrary to the Charter itself.
While the view favoring expanded powers of judicial review
does not as yet have the legal basis to make it law, it is worth
considering whether full judicial review could or perhaps should
be introduced. If this is to happen by conscious decision rather
than by case law based incremental change, it is not simply a
matter of deciding that judicial review would be good in principle. Such an increase requires an understanding of how it
might best be achieved, the scope of review, problems to be overcome, and the legal effect of a broader review power.
A.

TraditionalArguments for and against JudicialReview

The issue of judicial review has already received extensive
debate at the domestic level in countries such as the U.S. It is
perhaps valuable to consider the arguments proffered at this
level as well as an examination of how some of the same arguments might apply at the international level.
1. The U.S. Example
The U.S. Supreme Court arrogated the power of judicial review upon itself in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, referred to earlier. Far from symbolizing a political and legal
130

U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Add. 3, at 8, 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4ISR.2257 (1992).
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consensus in the U.S., the decision was greeted by controversy
and debate. 13 1
Those who argued against judicial review pointed out that
American judges are unelected and unaccountable, and thus
uncontrollable. The Legislature and the Executive are, on the
other hand, both elected and directly accountable to the people.
The decisions of the two political branches can be overturned,
whereas the decisions of constitutional courts are very difficult
to overturn. Detractors of judicial review further argued that
judicial interpretation of constitutional questions is often
merely the politics of power in the guise of legal reasoning.
Force and will play a more important part than judgment in
constitutional decision-making.
Defenders of judicial review asserted that the problem of
undemocratic courts was greatly overexagerrated. American
judges are appointed and confirmed by elected officials, and are
not necessarily any less trustworthy than their elected counterparts in political office. Some legitimacy may also be drawn
from the interpretation of a democratic document, the Constitution, adopted by the people. Moreover, the Court has overruled
its own decisions in the past, and the Constitution has been
amended (albeit only four times) to overrule Supreme Court
decisions.
Judicial review today serves a crucial role in the U.S. system of checks and balances, policing the democratic process.
But would it also function well on a global scale?
2.

The InternationalCourt of Justice

The Anti-Majoritarian Problem 132 arises at the international level and is similar to that of the legitimacy of unelected
U.S. judges. World Court judges are in fact elected by the
Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the two
following provisions of the Court's Statute:
2. The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges,
elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high
moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their
131 My discussion regarding this debate is based upon the excellent analysis of
the issue in Watson's article. Watson, supra note 6, at 28-30.
132 Watson, supra note 6, at 28-30.
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respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.
4(1). The members of the Court shall be elected by the General
Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in accordance with the following provisions.
There is thus a sense of democratic legitimacy that can be
said to differentiate the Court from the domestic situation such
as that found in the U.S. However, detractors point out that the
election process can be intensely political, 133 and although there
is no Charter or Statute provision for it, the permanent members tend to be represented on the Court.' 3 4 There are several
points in favor of judicial review at this level. While there is no
popular ballot for judges, the election is still more democratic
than, for example, the election of Council members, five of
whom hold permanent positions. There is no life tenure for
these judges. They must step down or run for re-election every
nine years. 13 5 This means that judges can be removed and decisions re-examined in a way that is not possible in the U.S. In
addition, it is not possible for one country to 'pack the court' as
36
it would be contrary to the provisions of the Statute.
It appears therefore that the Anti-Majoritarian problem is
not as big an issue as it was domestically in the U.S., due to the
sense of democratic legitimacy governing the election of judges.
The problem on this level is more a question of encouraging all
states to accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
Other problems mirroring those in the U.S., such as that of
an unchecked political power, were traditionally dealt with by
the set up of the Council, containing as it did a political system
of checks and balances enforced by the veto power. These
problems have now come to the fore in the search for a new
world order.
133

For a good analysis of the politics of judicial elections at the Court, see

THOMAS FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT
134 Watson, supra note 6, at 31.
135 STATUTE OF

I.C.J. art. 13,

(1986).

1.

Id. art. 3, 1 1. Specifically stating: "[t~he Court shall consist of fifteen members, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state."
136
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B. A New World Order
The delegates to the Conference rejected an institutionalized power of judicial review partly because the checking function was already served by the political balance of power on the
Council. The political situation of the 1990s differs greatly from
that of the mid-1940s, and perhaps necessitates the introduction of a judicial review power to reflect this. At the time of the
Namibia Case there were fears regarding an unchecked
Council:
[Ijimitations on the powers of the Security Council are necessary
because of the all too great ease with which any acutely controversial international situation can be represented as involving a latent threat to peace and security, even where it is really too
remote genuinely to constitute one. Without these limitations,
could be used for purposes
the functions of the Security Council
13 7
never originally intended ....

These fears are without question even more relevant in today's post-Cold War political climate in which the existing
checks have all but disappeared. While this view of Council intentions is certainly a pessimistic one, and ignores the fact that
effective Council action might necessitate the absence of a review power in order to act quickly, there are states which would
agree with it.
A good example of this problem is the relations between the
five permanent members of the Council and the rest of the U.N.
membership in Lockerbie. Were the permanent members simply allowed to decide on their vision of a world order and enforce
it? Or would there develop some system of checks and restraints on this executive power? Most states would not disagree with the outcome of Lockerbie, but there has undoubtedly
been some discomfort as to the manner of conduct of the involved permanent five members. Libya felt that three of the
permanent members of the Council, the U.K., U.S., and France,
its
exploited their powers under the Charter to deprive Libya of 138
rights under conventional and customary international law.
137 Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 294 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice). See
also Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K), 1992 I.C.J. at 43 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Bedjaoui).
138 Reisman, supra note 25, at 87. It must be said in defense of the U.S., U.K.
and Fr. that they did not use any powers that they did not have, and that other
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Libya's complaint goes to the heart of the current decisionmaking procedure. The Council is now believed to contain
smaller 'mini-Councils' which meet in secret and keep no
records. 139 The new practice moves in stages, from private
meetings of the U.S., U.K. and France away from the U.N.
premises, then to the five permanent members who may come
up with a draft resolution, and finally to soliciting the views of
the nonpermanent members of the Council, working towards a
140
resolution acceptable to all.
This sequence of events has been criticized for reasons of
both substance and procedure. The perception is that Council
decisions are in reality being taken by the permanent members,
and even more specifically by the U.S. This results in a feeling
of exclusion from the decision-making process for the thirdworld countries in particular, but also for developed countries
which are not the closest allies of the U.S. 14 ' These excluded

countries point to specific cases of effort expended being disproportionate to the result sought. Lockerbie, by way of example,
took place at a time when the Secretary-General was reluctant
to commit peacekeeping forces to the former Yugoslavia, argued
by many to be a more deserving case. 142 The U.S. and U.K. reject this charge but the perceptions remain and the importance
of this should not be underestimated. These perceptions relate
closely to the desire of many states for a structured power of
judicial review. 143 Certainly some of the smaller states would
be more comfortable with the introduction of some structural
restraints in the form of a modern constitution rather than, as
they perceive it, depending on the good will of the more powerful nations. 144 The implication of Lockerbie is the need for such
restraints, even if the effect of the decision was perhaps to clarify that they do not yet exist.
member states on the Council did have the opportunity to vote against their initiative in this matter. Thus, it cannot fairly be said that they 'exploited' their powers.
Libya's frustrations are understood best in the context of the reality of world politics in which many states choose not to oppose the initiatives of the more powerful
permanent members of the Council. Reisman, supra note 25, at 87.
139 Reisman, supra note 25, at 85.
140 Reisman, supra note 25, at 85; See also HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 8.
141 HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 8.
142 HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 8-9.
143 HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 9.
144 HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 9.
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This desire on the part of many of the less powerful nations
for an institutionalized power of judicial review must also be
understood in the context of a world which has rapidly changed,
leading to demands that the structure of the Council itself
should be reviewed. 145 During the period in which the Council
was paralyzed because of its ideological divide and reciprocal
use of the permanent power vetoes, the Assembly expanded
greatly with the addition of many newly independent states.
The changing face of the U.N. led to some states calling for a
change in the structure of the Council, with suggestions ranging
from the elimination of the veto power completely to a restructuring of the membership of the Council itself to take account of
changes in the world's political makeup since 1963, the date of
the last structural revision of the Council. These challenges are
146
now being heard.
It could well be argued then that the end of the Cold War
has brought with it the need for the implementation of judicial
review, to avoid a Council free to operate outside the boundaries
of international law. However, this ignores the political argument against judicial review. Now that the end of the Cold War
has finally allowed the Council to emerge from the shadow of its
permanent checkmate, why should we rush to ensure that its
freedom is once again put in shackles in the form of an activist
court? This is a relevant question, as even most advocates of
judicial review would not wish to return to a situation in which
the Council is again rendered virtually useless. The assumption upon which this question is based is that if the Court is
given a broad scope for review they will strike down everything
145 See G.A. Res. 47/62, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/26 (1992).
Here, the Assembly requested that the Secretary-General invite Member States to
submit written comments on a possible review of the membership of the Council.
146 This debate is presently being staged in the U.N. See U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/264 (1993); U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/2641
Add.1 (1993); U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/264/Add.2 (1993); U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/264/Add.3 (1993); U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/48/264/Add.4 (1993). The replies of Member States regarding their views
on restructuring the Council are contained in the aforementioned documents.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali referred to this issue in his 1993 Report as being of "crucial
importance" and foresaw that it would be resolved by the time of the U.N.'s 50th
anniversary; BouTRos BouTRos-GHALI, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION FROM THE FORTY-SEVENTH TO THE FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, 12 (1993).
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in sight. While there is really very little chance of this happening, noting that it has not occured in the U.S., perhaps the best
alternative is to deal with this problem by identifying a narrow
scope for review. This is a difficult issue which will undoubtedly
require some kind of compromise to satisfy all parties.
C.

Review by the Council Itself

Several ideas have already been advanced with regard to
using the Council structure itself to achieve the desired effect of
review, thus avoiding the need to make any changes in the
Court-Council relationship. The first idea implies that a potential restraint exists already within the Council in the form of
the de facto representation of the smaller states' interests by
some of the permanent members. 14 7 This assertion may be dismissed because realistically, little evidence suggests that this
functions as any kind of restraint. China has in the past portrayed itself as the representative of the third world, but it has
been known to cease this representation upon having some special interest of its own satisfied by the other permanent
members.'14s
A second suggestion has been that the potential veto power
held by the non-permanent members could be a limitation on
Council powers. 149 The members would need to vote as a bloc
for this to work, and this has historically not been the case,
leaving the power balance in the Council as originally
envisaged.
A third possibility would be to increase the number of nonpermanent members of the Council. This would likely result in
an unwieldly body, unable to take decisions quickly and effectively so as to bring the enforcement machinery of Chapter VII
of the Charter into action whenever international peace and security was threatened. 50 There would be more restraints on
the Council's actions but at the cost of an effective Council. An
increase in the number of permanent members is a realistic
Reisman, supra note 25, at 96.
Reisman, supra note 25, at 96.
Reisman, supra note 25, at 96.
150 This is an essential feature of the U.N. See D. BowETT,THE LAW OF INT'L
INSTIUTMONS 26 (4th ed. 1982); See also U.N. CHARTER art. 24, which speaks of
ensuring "prompt and effective action by the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art.
24.
147
148
149
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possibility, and one that may result from the aforementioned
pressures being brought to bear by an ever increasing Assembly
membership. The addition of such potential candidates as Japan and Germany, however, would not necessarily produce the
kind of limitations on Council action sought by members of the
Assembly. 15 1 There is already a certain community of interest
between these two powers and three of the present permanent
members, all part of the economic Group of Seven. Another possibility would be the addition of leading developing countries
such as Brazil or India, but again, there is no assurance that
once included they would ensure limitations on what in effect
152
would have become their own power.
D.

Security Council Interference with Court Functions

It seems that restructuring the Council may not in itself
provide an adequate substitute for judicial review. If this power
must lie with the Court, then as an initial step it would be very
helpful to strengthen the delineation between what is a judicial
function, and thus the responsibility of the Court, and what
falls within the scope of Council powers. The Council has already showed a penchant for encroachment on judicial powers
which it does not possess. This point was touched upon by a
Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission in
1992:
[a]s stipulated unambiguously in the Charter, the Security Council's powers consisted of making non-binding recommendations,
under Chapter VI, which dealt with dispute settlement, and also
binding decisions under Chapter VII, which dealt with measures
of collective security. The main point was that, according to the
doctrinal view - which did not appear to be seriously challenged
either in the legal literature or in practice -the Security Council
would not be empowered, when acting under Chapter VII, to impose settlements under Chapter VI in such a manner as to transform its recommendatory function153under VI into binding
settlements of disputes or situations.
151 Reisman, supra note 25, at 96.

Reisman, supra note 25, at 96.
See Report of Special Rapporteur G. Arangio-Ruiz, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
at 3, 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2277/Add. 3 (1992).
152

153
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Perhaps the best example of this was in the course of the
recent Lockerbie incident., It has been suggested that in Resolution 731, the Council simply decided the dispute in favor of the
U.S. and the U.K. without actually giving an explanation as to
why Libya would be obliged to surrender its nationals or pay
compensation for an act which had not at that point been legally
attributed to it.' T5 The judgment' was reached before Libya
even entered the argument, since it was ensured in advance, by
means of private consultations, that the resolution would be
155
adopted.
The determinations in the preamble of Resolution 748,
upon which the decisions in that resolution are predicated,
present a similar story. The demand that Libya renounce terrorism "by concrete actions" presupposes guilt. Therefore, the
resolution is based on an assumption of guilt that would be rejected by any judge in a Court of a democratic state, according
to Judge El-Kosheri in Lockerbie.156 The Council may have effectively acted as a dispute-settlement mechanism in deciding
this dispute, and resolved the substantive issues in favor of the
U.S. and the U.K. By endorsing their requests the Council recommended their terms as appropriate to settle the dispute, thus
transforming the terms of a settlement recommended under
Chapter VI power into a binding dispute settlement under
157
Chapter VII.
Thus, the proper channels for dispute resolution may be
avoided whenever one party manages to secure a Council decision in its favor. This would not appear to be in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the Charter, but there are no procedural safeguards against it happening. Arguably, on grounds
of natural justice and procedural due process, some institutionalized constitutional checks might be necessary. 158 This is not
to argue that the Court and the Council cannot consider an issue concurrently. It just puts into question to what extent the
154

Graefrath, supra note 52, at 191.

155 Graefrath, supra note 52, at 191. Again, while this is a commonly held

perception, it ignores the reality in which the other member states of the Council
could have voted against the resolution.
156 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K), 1992 I.C.J. at 92 (dissenting opinion of Judge ElKosheri).
157 See Graefrath, supra note 52, at 196.
15SMcWhinney, supra note 4, at 270.
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Council may interfere with Court procedures, thereby rendering
them meaningless.
The argument has been made that regardless of whether
the Council exercises quasi-judicial functions, its decisions
never reach the quality of a judicial decision and therefore cannot replace them and make the Court superfluous. 159 While
this may be so, such actions by the Council do result in uncertainty and conflict, and are best avoided altogether.
E. Scope of JudicialReview
The most difficult stage in the implementation of a stronger
judicial review power would undoubtably be the establishment
of some parameters for its exercise. How broad should the
scope for review be?
One view argues that a broad scope of review is essential.
Supporters of this view propose that whenever a matter is properly brought before the Court, that is either by a party to a dispute or when the Court is requested to give an advisory opinion,
the Court's jurisdiction should not be questioned, even if it has
been called on to decide on the legality of a Council Resolution.160 The opposite view would be that what little review powers the Court currently possesses in Chapter VI situations are
probably sufficient. The necessity for change thus ranges from
none or very little to possibly a significant amount.
Any suggested scope of review will obviously reflect an individual's views regarding the ideal balance between Council effectiveness and states' rights. To allow the Court unlimited
powers of review would undoubtably increase the likelihood
that states' rights would not be trampled by an unchecked
Council. Unfortunately, such an all-encompassing scope of review would also ensure that any state which found itself the
focus of Council action could mount a legal defense in front of
the Court, possibly gaining interim measures and thus frustrating the speed and efficiency necessary in Council actions intended to avoid or defuse a threat to security. 1 1 This would be
Graefrath, supra note 52, at 204.
160 Graefrath, supra note 52, at 204.
161 The same problems would likely be relevant to the suggestion that a review
function could be fulfilled by the creation of a special ad hoc tribunal for Judicial
Review.
159
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problematic in the post-Cold War era where there is a need for
some new checks on Council power to be introduced for reasons
already discussed.
On what grounds then should questions be admitted for review? Should it be possible for the Court to review the Council's delegated power to determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression? Presently,
the case law seems to indicate support for the view that this is a
non-reviewable competence given to the Council, based on Article 39 of the Charter. 1 6 2 While allowing the review of such

Council decisions would alleviate fears that the Council might
'create' trumped up threats to the peace, amendments to this
power would also most likely sacrifice any credible collective security function to be exercised by the Council. To submit every
determination of a threat to review would provide for intermi163
nable delay in situations requiring fast and efficient action.
It seems that at this initial stage it is very important to
allow the Council to operate as currently provided for in the
Charter. Any increase in the scope of review should come when
the Council has determined the threat and is ready to act or has
already acted.
Where the Council has identified a breach and proposes to
act, it is possible to suggest a quasi-political power of judicial
review as a new alternative. Under this 'veto-reference' power,
before the Council actually acted it would be possible for any
Council member state (veto or non-veto) to ask the Court for an
advisory opinion on the legality of the proposed action. If the
Court found the act to be ultra vires the Council's power, the
164
state would have effectively 'vetoed' the use of that action.
In a situation in which the Council has already acted it is
perhaps worth reconsidering review based on Article 25 of the
Charter. As it stands, the requirement that members carry out
Council decisions 'in accordance with the present Charter' has
been interpreted as a procedural limitation. If it was agreed
162 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures Order, Bosnia v. Yugo., 1993 I.C.J. 325
(Sept. 13).
163 See IGGINs, supra note 24, at 10.
164 The notion of "veto reference" power stems from a discussion I had with
Professor Donald Buckingham, Associate Professor at the University of Western
Ontario Faculty of Law (London, Ontario), on November 12, 1994.
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that in the future this was to be interpreted as a substantive
limitation, it would permit the Court to review Council decisions to ensure they are intra vires Council power. There are
several advantages to increasing the scope for review in this
way. First, no Charter revisions would be necessary as the
present wording of Article 25 would suffice. Only an agreement
regarding interpretation need be concluded. Second, the only
limitation provided for would be that decisions be in accordance
with the present Charter. This presents without a doubt the
most problems. Substantively, it is not always readily apparent
what it means to be 'in accordance with the present Charter,' as
is evident from the lack of concrete discussion on this point by
members of the Court. Keeping these problems in mind, the use
of this new interpretation of Article 25 focuses upon the Charter, an area with which the Court is already familiar. Finally,
such a limitation would likely be sufficient to satisfy any concerns that states might have about unchecked Council power.
Another positive step would be to allow the Court to review
Council decisions which conflict with principles ofjus cogens, as
suggested in the earlier discussion of the Bosnia v. Yugoslavia
orders. Since the Charter is a treaty, it is reasonable to conclude that it cannot authorize acts which would violate these
customary norms. 165 Such a power would not be without its
problems, namely that it may not be entirely clear whether or
not certain principles may be classified as jus cogens (certain
accepted norms are that states may not enter into treaties to
perpetuate apartheid, slavery, or to commit genocide). 166 Given
the importance of principles of this kind, however, such a problem seems to be a better solution than allowing the Council to
overtly contradict accepted peremptory norms of international
law.
It has been suggested that certain questions should not fall
within an increased scope of review.167 Differences in purely
political judgment should probably be excluded, leaving that
role to the Council. There is some question of what constitutes
'purely political judgment,' as discussed earlier when consider165 See Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, supra note 29, at art. 53;
providing that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a principle ofjus cogens.
166 Watson, supra note 6, at 37.
167 Bowett, supra note 18.
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ing the problem of judicial activity by the Council, and this
would no doubt be the cause of some problems. Procedural irregularities could also be excluded from review, as the Council
has its own rules of procedure and is master of such. An exception could be made in a case in which a procedural irregularity
denies a state a fair hearing.
One important issue is how the changes should be brought
about. Should the Court simply attempt to arrogate power
through its decisions in the manner of Marbury v. Madison? To
arrogate such power incrementally might prevent a flood of review requests. Realistically, however, the legal basis for such a
move does not seem to exist, and the Court has shown a definite
reluctance to clash with defined powers of the Council. In the
interests of clarity and certainty there needs to be an explicit
international agreement to this effect.
F. Problems with Implementation
An increased power of judicial review would necessarily
lead to a larger role in defining the Charter, which could cause
some problems. The Charter is both a Constitution, in that it
establishes organs of U.N. government, rules of governmental
procedure, and some substantive norms for international conduct, as well as a mere treaty, outlining fundamental substantive norms by which states must conduct themselves. 168 As
such, the Charter is the obvious place for the Court to start
when interpreting the actions of other U.N. organs. While the
text is unquestionably dispositive on some matters, 169 the guidance is less clear in cases in which the Council violates substantive fundamental norms.
The problem is particularly evident in the area of interpreting states' rights. This is partly due to important internal qualifications such as that regarding internal sovereignty:
2(7). Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
168 Watson, supra note 6, at 33.
169 See U.N. CHARTER art. 25. This article contains the binding nature of the
Council's decisions.
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Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.170 (emphasis added)
Qualifications such as this make the process of interpretation an extremely difficult one. Other particular problems with
the interpretation of states' sovereign rights include Articles
1(2) and 55 of the Charter which discusses equal rights clauses
for states. 1 71 These were both used by Judge E1-Kosheri in his
dissent in Lockerbie to defend Libya's sovereign right not to ex17 2
tradite its nationals.
Apart from these norms there appear to be few specifics on
which the Court could rely to analyze questions of states'
rights. There are no provisions regarding due process or free
speech as found in the U.S. Constitution.173 When one looks
outside the Charter to see if the Court could find its guidance
there, it rapidly becomes evident that most 'rights' treaties focus on human, and not states' rights. 74 In any case, Charter
Article 103's supremacy provision would make it hard to rely on
a treaty provision if anything could be found to the contrary in
the Charter itself.
G.

The Effects of Judicial Review

Once the scope for review is established, it remains to consider the effect of such review, that is to say the effect of a Court
finding that a Council Resolution was ultra vires. Would such a
resolution then be void ab initio (inoperative as though it had
never been passed) or would the Court's decision be binding on
the parties to the suit but no one else? The text of the Statute
supports the latter view. Article 59 states: "[tihe decision of the
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case." This explicit limitation would
seem to be the best guideline available. The view is reinforced
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2. On the purposes of the U.N., the article specifically reads: "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." See also U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
172 Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. at 101 (dissenting opinion of Judge
El-Kosheri).
170
171

173

Watson, supra note 6, at 35.

See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
174
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when it is considered that the Court does not have the same
tradition of stare decisis as many domestic courts. 175
Even a decision that binds only the parties to it, may in
practice have broad effects. If, for example, Libya had been successful in its quest to have the Court strike down the Council
resolutions ordering extradition of its nationals and imposing
worldwide sanctions, all other countries previously bound to uphold these sanctions would no longer be so bound. In that situation it would even be possible for Libya to persuade the Court to
order a state to stop enforcing the sanctions against Libya,
based on the overruled resolutions. 17 6 In any case, a doctrine
favoring the traditional balance between a weak Court and a
strong Council will likely be more acceptable to the permanent
177
members of the Council.
CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that there exists a solid base of support
for the existence of a power of judicial review. However, it is
important to distinguish between the desirability of such a
power and its legal existence. While the case law shows strong
signs that it is desirable, most judges stop short of actually attributing powers of judicial review in Chapter VII situations to
the Court. This is because the provisions of the Charter clearly
delegate sole authority to determine threats to the peace to the
Council, and make its decisions binding by virtue of Article 25.
In addition, the Charter's travaux prdparatoires expressly reject any institutionalized powers of review for the Court.
Have we seen the first real signs that the Court will arrogate the power on itself, despite the absence of a legal basis for
such action? Although Lockerbie clearly raised the question, to
interpret this case as some have done as the international
equivalent of Marbury v. Madison would be to read too much
into the individual opinions expressed by some of the judges.
What this case does show is that such a power is now clearly
considered to be desirable in the post-Cold War era. Concerns
regarding the protection of state sovereignty have made room
for an increased role for the Court at a time when the Council
175 Watson, supra note 6, at 40.
176 Watson, supra note 6, at 41-42.
177 Watson, supra note 6, at 43.
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has seen its powers blossom. Unquestionably, a more activist
Court would turn into an international institution of major
political importance.
How should the deliberate omission of a review power from
the Charter be rectified? In the interests of certainty a clear
revision to Charter powers would seem to be the best solution,
rather than an immediate or gradual arrogation by the Court.
However, this still leaves the problem of determining the scope
for review. This problem more than any other may prevent any
changes to the status quo in the near future. In the meantime,
the Court will continue to voice its concern over unchecked
Council power, virtually powerless to review the Council's
Chapter VII decisions.
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